It took a year for strategists and think tankists of all stripes US/Israel to realize the extent of the damage and to understand to what extent their war strategy is dated and how it has lost all its meaning in the face of this “royal voice” that the axis of the Resistance and its great commander-in-chief Soleimani has traced in less than 4 decades…
whose martyrdom is commemorated these days with unequaled fervor in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and of course, wherever there is any resistance to imperialism.
Zionist army spokesman Hidai Zilberman could as many times as he likes try to bulge his chest and tell reporters at the Saudi Elaph site as he did in a December 25 interview that an Israeli submarine is operating in the Persian Gulf not far from the Iranian coast in support of the nuclear USS Georgia in anticipation of a major strike against Iran just before Trump breaks free, the worthy military analysts make the following observation: the 13 “Qiam” and “Fateh 113” missiles that the IRGC fired against Ain al-Asad in Iraq as well as this “ring of missiles” that began years ago to gradually encircle the Zionist Entity from North to South, throughout the years when Israel sold to its public the myth of “chasing Iran and its proxies out of Syria”, refers to the same strategic principle, pushing the enemy to disperse, its forces, to move away from each other, in short, its sense of cohesion, to disappear, while keeping it under threat. “Lethal Arrow”, the latest exercise that the Zionist army wanted to be an offensive outburst in the face of Hezbollah, which has pushed it since July 21 to be in a state of permanent alert and which has mobilized the army, the air force, the navy and every Israeli intelligence apparatus, is a marvelous illustration of this organic implosion, this impossibility of interconnection from which the entity suffers not only at the societal level but also at the level of its army.
Ron Ben Yishai, an Israeli expert, makes this astonishing observation in his October article:
“In view of all this, I was surprised by what was revealed to my eyes and ears when I arrived at the exercise area on Tuesday afternoon. Instead of the city of tents and APC troop transports that I was used to seeing in similar situations, I found in the divisional command barely thirty officers and combatants, along with four or five vehicles. The division commander, Brigadier General Saar Tzur, and seven of his men were sitting in a small tent with masks on their faces, and the others were outside. The tent itself was hidden near the line of contact, overlooking the cell in the area where the fighting took place. Contact with the main divisional headquarters somewhere in Galilee was made by videoconference on plasma screens, but when the brigade battle commanders wanted to communicate and receive instructions from the division commander, they simply came to see him physically – and after a few minutes they returned to their men…. cohesion was not there”.
As a sign of this non-existent joint cohesion, Hezbollah succeeded on the second day of the same exercise in anchoring a spectacular reconnaissance operation using its Mohajer drones and identifying targets to shoot down over a distance of 50 kilometers between Galilee and the Shebba farms. Clearly, the Israeli army is struggling to feed the multiple battlefields in the absence of a large infantry that can be quickly mobilized from one terrain to another, air support and alert intelligence, which prevents it from overwhelming the enemy and remaining in control of the terrain. However, since January 8, 2020, the date on which Iran launched the first strike in history against a permanent American base, and this, before the bewildered eyes of the entire world, the US Army has been sharing the same fate: At the time The National Interest published an article warning US military strategists against the end of the concept of a US base camp, a concept that had allowed the United States of America, a state of settlers by essence, to gain increasing influence at the expense of the defeated countries of the Second World War: “It is cumbersome and impossible to protect a base and the Iranians were the first to understand this defect and especially the first to dare to exploit it against. It is like our warships in the Persian Gulf”.
“Instead of relying on a small number of large, permanent bases near Iran, the United States should focus on a set of small, scattered bases. The shift to a strategy of less military presence will have to go hand in hand with more diplomacy in the region, and all of this requires the United States to use a flexible distributed architecture for the security of U.S. forces. By the way, the Iranian ballistic missile strike against Ain al-Asad proved that troop concentration is a weakness. We have seen it in Iraq, we see it in Syria, hence the need to stick to a permanent rotation (which is what the US military convoys in constant circulation between Syria and Iran do under the pretext of oil trafficking, editor’s note).
The text adds: “The bases at al-Udeid and al-Dhafra in the United Arab Emirates are being expanded to accommodate more American soldiers on a permanent basis. This is a flaw since Iran, which possesses the largest missile arsenal in the Middle East, could easily damage the largest and most important U.S. bases. Moreover, the U.S. defense capability is not unlimited. For example, they do not have enough Patriot missile systems. Sending large numbers of Patriot missiles to the Middle East reduces the stockpile of these systems in India, the Pacific, and Europe. However, even if the U.S. has sufficient air defense systems, Iran will still have the number of missiles needed to bypass these systems. … Withdrawal of large bases near Iran is necessary because large air bases are more damaging to U.S. interests than they are protecting them…. The United States should reduce the current base structure to a set of smaller bases spread throughout the region … and then in the event of a crisis with Iran, it should move its forces from the vicinity of the Persian Gulf to more distant bases, such as Shahid Mowaffaq Air Base in Jordan or Prince Sultan’s base, because Iran has fewer missiles to reach them”.
Is it not the strategic concept of enemy “dispersal,” widely applied to Israel, that prevails here, after its perfectly successful application to America? Of course it does. However, even when deployed in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, U.S. troops are exposed to Resistance fire… A few days ago we learned that the Saudi-Iraqi border was placed under the control of the Hashds.
by Basit Abbasi