Hochstein, the American envoy in the case of the delineation of the maritime borders of Lebanon and occupied Palestine, announced to the Lebanese authorities that he would resume his talks with the relevant authorities involved in this case in the coming days and by the end of this week.
Everything can therefore change at the end of the week, the deadline set by Hezbollah being in September and Lebanon having already warned that in case of the failure of the Us mediation, the clash is inevitable. But now things are starting to move in an unexpected direction, and without any military investment other than the three drones that Hezbollah launched on July 2, whose successful mission was less about proving that the Resistance has a constant eye on the entity than about demonstrating the Resistance’s ability to synchronize its drones within a single swarm and assign them different missions – in other words, to make the other side find itself in a hybrid warfare environment.
On July 2, two of the main components of Israel’s integrated flak system, namely the one linked to its air force – F16, F35 – as well as its Barak-1 naval flak system, were attacked by two of the three Hezbollah UAVs, which were tasked with protecting the third UAV, which came close to Karish without being detected by any radar. On August 28, a warning video released by Hezbollah featured this third UAV, which on the images turned out to be not a sophisticated ISR UAV but a Shahed-129 equipped with Almas anti-tank missiles.
Between July 2 and August 28 two other videos were posted online on Hezbollah’s ballistic capabilities including its sea-side and anti-ship missiles. A synthesis of these snippets of revelation leads us to one conclusion: it is with a hybrid naval power that Israel will find itself face to face if the Karish affair does not lead to a respect of Lebanese offshore rights. Indeed, in the event of a clash, there is now a great risk that the Eastern Mediterranean, where the US Fourth Fleet operates, as well as almost all of the NATO armada with large bases in Greece and Cyprus, among others, will become a place of confrontation between two opposing tactics of warfare, regular and asymmetrical.
The slightest advantage of one over the other could well be exported to other fields, including Ukraine. Let’s imagine Hezbollah’s speedboats with reconnaissance, combat and kamikaze drones on board, which would be placed under a unified C2 (command and control) and would leave successively or synchronously on a mission, first to neutralize Israel’s coastal flak and then its embarked flak, while engaging the Israeli air flak (planes) to the maximum. It will be a naval combat theater thus very quickly emptied of its warning radars and its defence capabilities and thus perfectly able to pass under the deluge of missiles. Such a scenario will obviously not leave Russia indifferent, and it will draw the necessary lessons from it, especially as this Karish story also concerns it directly.
Indeed, the contract that the EU has made Egypt bleed and to which the Zionist entity has taken and which according to the latest information risks prolonging Egypt in the dark, contract turned around the wealth of Karish, is to fill the gap left by the absence of Russian gas in Europe, which indirectly places the Russians in the camp of Hezbollah. Some political analysts even go so far as to see through this way of doing the Resistance a reminiscence of the Russian policy that Europe calls a gas weapon but which is after all only a way to use its assets in the direction of preserving its interests.
Charles Abi Nader, a retired Lebanese general, states in this sense: the gas of the Eastern Mediterranean is now at the heart of global confrontations: the partial replacement of Russian gas by the extraction of a sufficient quantity of gas in the Mediterranean will change the deal on the international scene. The Russians have thus managed to turn gas into an effective weapon that has broken the Western camp. Nothing would prevent Lebanon from doing the same. Except that Lebanon is doing even a little better, namely it is not using its gas itself but its reserves to be exploited to put its weight on a gas equation from which it has been excluded since its independence. By the way, if Lebanon did not possess the assets that make up its strength and its deterrent capacity, Israel would not have resumed the process of indirect negotiations suspended since October 2021, the US would never have sent its envoy to talk about it, in short none of these developments would have taken place.
Stressing the deterrent capacity of the Lebanese Resistance, he said that the dispatch of the drones, even if it is admitted that they were shot down over the last few days, would have been a mistake.